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The Rule Against Contact with Represented Persons

The rule against attorney contact with a represented person is
deeply entrenched in the law of lawyering. 1 Its origins date back to
the early 1800s, 2 and today the rule is enforced through a broad

1. See In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 485 (D.N.M. 1992) (stating that "the ban
on communicating with a represented party is a fundamental principle of both state and
federal law, is incorporated into federal law through the local rules, and has its roots in
our common law tradition.").
2. See John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client: The
Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interests, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 683, 684 n.6 (1979)
(tracing the origins of the rule to a statement in David Hoffman's treatise, which stated,
"I will never enter into any conversation with my opponent's client, relative to his claim
or defense, except with the consent, and in the presence of his counsel.").
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variety of mechanisms, including discipline,3 disqualification, 4
evidentiary rulings,5 and equitable relief.6 As embodied in Rule 4.2

3.
See, e.g., People v. McCray, 926 P.2d 578, 579 (Colo. 1996) (censuring
lawyer publicly); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS
Standard 6.3 (1991). Standard 6.3, Improper Communications with Individuals in the
Legal System, states in relevant part:
6.31 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer...
(c) improperly communicates with someone in the legal system other
than a witness, judge, or juror with the intent to influence or affect the
outcome of the proceeding, and causes significant or potentially significant
interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.
6.32 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in
communication with an individual in the legal system when the lawyer knows
that such communication is improper, and causes injury or potential injury to
a party or causes interference or potential interference with the outcome of
the legal proceeding.
6.33 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in
determining whether it is proper to engage in communication with an
individual in the legal system, and causes injury or potential injury to a party
or interference or potential interference with the outcome of the legal
proceeding.
6.34 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an
isolated instance of negligence in improperly communicating with an
individual in the legal system, and causes little or no actual or potential injury
to a party, or causes little or no actual or potential interference with the
outcome of the legal proceeding.
4. See, e.g., In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 1998 WL 105451, at *1 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio, March 11, 1998) (granting disqualification based on contact by
plaintiffs' counsel with individual defendant who was later non-suited from action);
Shoney's, Inc. v. Lewis, 875 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Ky. 1994) (disqualifying attorney for
interviewing general manager of corporation targeted for suit, and suppressing
statements).
5.
See, e.g., Camden v. Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1123-24 (D. Md. 1996)
(barring the opposing party, based on improper contact with a respresented person, from
using the represented person's testimony and disqualifying the firm that committed the
infraction); Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 723-24 (W.D.
Ky. 1991) appeal dism'd, 659 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1981) (restoring to class, pending new
decision on opting out, persons who opted out of class after being improperly contacted).
See also Leonard E. Gross, Suppression of Evidence as a Remedy for Attorney
Misconduct: Shall the Sins of the Attorney Be Visited upon the Client?, 54 ALBANY L.
REv. 437, 446-48 (1990) (arguing that the suppression of evidence that is obtained in
violation of legal ethics is a legitimate mechanism for enforcing the rules of professional
conduct).
6. See, e.g., Impervious PaintIndus., 508 F. Supp. at 724.
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of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional

Conduct, this anti-contact standard provides that: "In representing a
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by

another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the
other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." 7
A version of the rule exists in every American jurisdiction.'
Although the language of state standards often differs from the ABA
model, 9 in important substantive respects, local variations are
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1997). The legislative
history of Rule 4.2 is recounted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR.,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 264-68 (1997).
8.
See United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1448-49 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(stating that "the rule or its equivalent is now in effect in every state"), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
9.
See, e.g., CAL. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 2-100 (1998):
(A) While representing a client, a member shall not communicate directly or
indirectly about the subject of the representation with a party the member
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the member
has the consent of the other lawyer ....
(C) This rule shall not prohibit:
(1) Communications with a public officer, board, committee, or body;
(2)

Communications initiated by a party seeking advice or
representation from an independent lawyer of the party's choice;
or

(3)

Communications otherwise authorized by law.

FLA. BAR R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4-4.2 (1997):
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attorney may, without such prior
consent, communicate with another's client in order to meet the requirements
of any statute or contract requiring notice or service of process directly on an
adverse party, in which event the communication shall be strictly restricted
to that required by statute or contract, and a copy shall be provided to the
adverse party's attorney.
N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSBILiTY DR 7-104 (1997):
A. During the course of the representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
1. Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by a lawyer
in that matter unless the lawyer has the prior consent of the lawyer
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normally indistinguishable from the Model Rule or its nearly identical
predecessor in the now-superseded ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility." ° A more detailed, but not significantly different,
version of the rule also appears in the emerging Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers."'
representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
TEx. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4.02, reprintedin TEx. GOV'T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G. app. A (Vernon Supp. 1997) (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9):
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause or
encourage another to communicate about the subject of the representation
with a person, organization or entity of government the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer regarding that subject, unless the lawyer has
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
Some differences between state codes and the ABA model result from the fact that,
at its annual meeting in 1995, the ABA House of Delegates amended the text of Rule 4.2.
As originally written, the Rule spoke of a "party" (rather than a "person") who was
represented. That choice of phraseology engendered debate about whether the Rule
applied in the non-litigation context. As a result, "[t]he amendment changed the word
'party' to 'person' in the text of the Rule and extensively revised the Comment to the
Rule." GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 262.
10. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-18 and DR 7104(A) (1980). Ethical Consideration 7-18 stated in part:
The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons in need of
legal service or assistance are represented by their own counsel. For this
reason a lawyer should not communicate on the subject matter of the
representation of his client with a person he knows to be represented in the
matter by a lawyer, unless pursuant to law or rule of court or unless he has
the consent of the lawyer for that person.
Disciplinary Rule 7-104 provided in relevant part:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in the
matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other
party or is authorized by law to do so.
11. RESTATEMENT (TIHIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Draft
No. 8, 1997):
Section 158. Represented Non-Client-General Anti-Contact Rule
(1) A lawyer representing a client in a matter may not communicate about
the subject of the representation with a non-client whom the lawyer knows to
be represented in the matter by another lawyer, or with a representative of an
organizational non-client so represented as defined in § 159, unless:
(a) the communication is with a public officer or agency to the extent
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Two facets of the ABA Model Rule on communication with a
represented person are striking. First, within its scope, the Rule

states an absolute prohibition, rather than a restriction on time, place,
or manner. Second, the demands of the Rule cannot be waived by the
represented person whose interests are at stake. 12 If one were
addressing the subject tabula rasa, it would be possible to articulate
a less stringent standard that might adequately serve the purposes of
the Rule. A standard seeking to protect represented persons from

overreaching by lawyers who represent adverse interests might do that
by banning conduct that overreaches, rather than by prohibiting all
contact entirely. For example, a rule might prohibit communications
with a represented person about the subject matter of the representation if those communications involve fraud or other forms of
misrepresentation, 13 or amount to undue influence. 4 Alternatively,
to address concerns about the possibly improper content of communistated in § 161;
(b) the lawyer is a party and represents no other client in the matter;
(c) the communication is authorized by law;
(d) the communication reasonably responds to an emergency; or
(e) the other lawyer consents.
(2) Subsection (1) does not prohibit the lawyer from assisting the client in
otherwise proper communication by the lawyer's client with a represented
non-client, unless the lawyer thereby seeks to deceive or overreach the
non-client.
12. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95396 (1995) (stating that "[w]hile the Committee recognizes that not allowing the
represented person to waive the Rule's protection may be seen as paternalistic, it believes
that Rule 4.2 requires that result."); see also Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1462 (noting that "it
would be a mistake to speak in terms of a party 'waiving' her 'rights.'. . . The rule
against communicating with represented parties is fundamentally concerned with the
duties of attorneys, not with the rightsof parties.").
13. Such an approach frequently is followed by rules applicable to
communications about the terms and availability of legal services. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1997). Rule 7.1 provides in part, "A
lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services."
14. A variation of this form of regulation is employed by Rule 7.3 of the MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1997) with respect to solicitation of employment
by targeted mail. The Rule provides in relevant part: "(b) A lawyer shall not solicit
professional employment from a prospective client by written ... communication...
if:... (2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment."
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cations occurring outside the presence of the represented person's

lawyer, a rule might require that all communications with a represented person be in writing and that copies of such writings be

retained by their originator or provided to an appropriate party."5
Also, a rule intended to protect represented persons could, as many
rules do,1 6 condition the permissibility of the lawyer's conduct on
consent by the represented person. Another alternative to a total
prohibition of contact would be to require opposing counsel to notify

the attorney for the represented person of each communication, either
before it occurs or after it takes place. However, these and other
moderate approaches to protecting persons represented by counsel
have been eschewed. It makes no difference whether the opposing
lawyer treated the represented party unfairly17 or even whether the
represented person, rather than the adverse lawyer, initiated the

exchange.18 Any communication about the subject matter of the
representation is wholly banned, except as allowed by law or by

consent of the represented person's counsel. Thus, as presently
formulated in American jurisprudence, the rule against contact with
represented persons is both sweeping and inflexible.

15. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(b) ("A copy or
recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be kept for two years after
its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used."Y; TEX.
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 7.07 ("[A] lawyer shall file with the Lawyer
Advertisement and Solicitation Review Committee of the State Bar of Texas, either
before or currently with the mailing or sending of a written solicitation communication
a copy of the written solicitation communication.").
16. For example, several conflict of interest rules condition the permissibility of
lawyer conduct on consent by the affected layperson. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7(a)(2) and (b)(2), 1.8(a)(3), 1.9(a) and (b), and
1.12(a).
17. Cf. In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 1998 WL 105451, at *6 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio, March 11, 1998) (finding represented person rule violation even though person
with whom plaintiffs' counsel communicated was shortly thereafter non-suited from

action); In re McCaffrey, 549 P.2d 666, 668 (Or. 1976) (reprimanding lawyer who
unknowingly communicated improperly with a party represented by a lawyer and finding
it "immaterial whether the direct communication is an intentional or a negligent violation
of the rule.").
18. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95396 (1995) (stating that "[tlhe fact that the represented person is the one who initiates a
communication does not render inapplicable the prohibition on communicating about the
subject matter of the representation.").
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A sense of the exacting demands of the "represented person" rule

can be gained by contrasting this standard with the rules that govern
what many persons view as the most odious ethical violation by
lawyers-"ambulance chasing."19 With limited exceptions, 2" written
solicitation of an accident victim is ethically permissible if the
statements made are truthful and not misleading. 2 Oral communica-

tion with an accident victim is also allowed if the injured person
initiates the conversation.'
In contrast, under the rule against
communicating with represented persons, neither written communications nor communications initiated by a represented person are
ethically permissible.

II. Contact with Class Members
As a codified standard, the application of the represented person
rule is def'mitionally driven. Among the key questions are: who is a
"person" within the meaning of the rule; when does "representation"

begin and end; what "matters" are within the scope of a representa-

19. See Gerald S. Reamey, The Crime of Barratry:CriminalResponsibilityfor
a Breach of ProfessionalResponsibility, 53 TEx. B.J. 1011, 1011 (1990) (noting that
"[s]uch misconduct is not.., merely a breach of professional etiquette or a violation of
disciplinary rules. It is also a crime.").
20. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 633 (1995) (finding that
on appropriate facts, a state may impose a thirty day waiting period on written
communications by lawyers with accident victims).
21. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988) (finding that
non-misleading targeted mail is constitutionally protected).
22. See Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing
Partnersand Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and DisciplinaryLiability, 50 U. PrIT. L.
REV. 1, 95 (1988) (commenting that "an attorney may not be disciplined for responding
to communications initiated by a prospective client."); see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 14.2.5, at 788 n.6 (1986) (stating that "the Code does not
prohibit solicitation of a client so long as the person solicited has initiated the contact
with the lawyer."); Rhoades v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 399 N.E.2d 969, 972 (Ill. 1979)
(finding that "the cases generally condemn as unlawful solicitation the drumming up or
procurement of legal business ... [from] potential clients who have not initiated contact
with the attorney."). Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 cmt. 7
(1997) (noting that labeling requirements ordinarily applicable to written communications
about legal services do not apply to communications sent in response to requests of
potential clients).
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tion; and when does a lawyer "know" that a person is represented by
another lawyer in a matter?13 Although there is considerable authority
bearing upon these and related issues,24 there are still important
unresolved questions relating to the interpretation of the rule,'

including its proper operation in class action litigation.
In the context of class actions, it is now generally agreed that the
lawyer for a certified class represents all putative members of the
class,26 at least until they elect to opt out of the class.' This is true
even though putative members of the class may never have communi-

cated with the class attorney or may not even know that the class
action exists. The court's certification of the class, at least for
purposes of this rule, is deemed to create a lawyer-client relationship

23. See generally ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct § 71:301
et seq. (1997) (detailing obligations to third parties and communications involving
persons represented by counsel).
24. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95396 (1995) (providing an extensive discussion of "Communications with Represented
Persons"); see also Barbara Hanson Nellermoe & Fidel Rodriguez, Professional
Responsibility and the Litigator: A Comprehensive Guide to Texas DisciplinaryRules
3.01 Through 4.04, 28 ST. MARY's L.J. 443, 491-95 (1997) (discussing Texas
precedent).
25. One such question having great importance is whether, in the context of
litigation, a discharged attorney ceases to "represent" a client before a formal change in
counsel of record. In In re News American Publishing,Inc., 1998 WL 105451 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio, March 11, 1998), the court, following the lead of an earlier ABA
ethics opinion, held that representation does not cease merely because the client states
that the lawyer has been terminated and that "'if retained counsel has entered an
appearance in a matter. . . and remains counsel of record .... the communicating
lawyer may not communicate with the person until the lawyer has withdrawn her
appearance."' In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 1998 WL 105451, at *6 (quoting ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995)).
26. See, e.g., Haffer v. Temple Univ., 115 F.R.D. 506, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(citing DR 7-104(A) and finding that defense counsel's conduct was a "flagrant and
inexcusable violation of professional standards"); Tedesco v. Mishkin, 629 F. Supp.
1474, 1483 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that "once the court certified the class ...a
limited attorney-client relationship existed between plaintiffs' attorney and absent class
members"); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D. 370, 377 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (stating
that "the disciplinary rule clearly applies in suits which proceed as a class action").
27. See Impervious Paint Indus., Inc. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 722-23
(W.D. Ky. 1991) (finding that contact during opt-out period violated the rule against
communication with represented persons).
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between class counsel and putative class members.2" This view is

consistent with language in the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, which provides that the relationship of client and lawyer is

established not only when a person manifests to a lawyer the person's
intent for the lawyer to provide legal services, but also when "a
tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to provide the
services." 29 The members of a certified class are "represented" by
reason of the court's certification of the class and designation of class

counsel; because they are represented, they come within the scope of
the rule and normally may not be contacted by opposing counsel."
Thus, in the context of mass tort litigation, defense counsel may not
communicate with potential members of the plaintiff class except with
the consent of counsel for the class or as authorized by law, including
authorization by an order of the court.31 Moreover, because a lawyer
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §158 cmt. I
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997) (commenting that "according to the majority of decisions,
once the proceeding has been certified as a class action, the members of the class are
considered clients of the lawyer for the class.").
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. f
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). Comment f to Section 26 elaborates:
Class actions may pose difficult questions of client identification. For
many purposes, the named class representatives are the clients of the lawyer
for the class ....
[C]lass members who are not named representatives also
have some characteristics of clients. For example, their confidential
communications directly to the class lawyer may be privileged . . . and
opposing counsel may not be free to communicate with them directly ....
Members of the class often lack the incentive or knowledge to monitor the
performance of the class representatives. Although members may sometimes
opt out of the class, they may have no practical alternative other than
remaining in the class if they wish to enforce their rights. Lawyers in class
actions thus have duties to the class as well as to the class representatives.
30. See Fulco v. Continental Cablevision, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 45, 47 (D. Mass.
1992) (stating that after certification, "defendants' counsel must treat the unnamed class
members as 'represented by' the class counsel for purposes of DR 7-104").
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §158 cmt. g
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997):
A tribunal, in the exercise of its authority over advocates appearing before it
. . . and over proceedings generally, may expand the right of a lawyer to
make ex parte contact with a non-client represented by opposing counsel.
Such a court order is usually entered after notice and hearing. For example,
although a lawyer for plaintiffs in a certified class action is considered to
represent all members of the class ....
the court may permit defense counsel

1998]

COMMUNICATING WITH A CLASS MEMBER

507

may not "violate ... the rules of professional conduct ... through
the acts of another, 32 a lawyer may not induce or assist a client or
others to engage in types of communication with putative class
members that the lawyer may not undertake directly. 3
Application of the represented person rule to the pre-certification
period in class action litigation requires a different analysis. Absent
a judicial determination that a class should be certified, there is no
basis for concluding that an unnamed potential member of a class,
who has never been in contact with the lawyer seeking to certify the
class, should be treated as having a lawyer. 34 The unnamed putative
class member has not sought legal services, nor has a court ordered
that they should be rendered to that person. Accordingly, a number
of courts hold that the represented person rule does not prohibit
communications between defense counsel and potential members of

to approach class members directly if in the circumstances the court

concludes that such persons will not be subjected to overreaching and that
direct contact would otherwise be appropriate.
32.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(a) (1997).

33.

See Impervious Paint Indus., Inc. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 722-23

(W.D. Ky. 1991) (finding that even though it was "undisputed that [defense] counsel did
not personally contact any class member," the evidence showed that the defendant's
representatives contacted class members "after consulting with counsel" and that
"counsel had full knowledge of their client's intention to attempt to sabotage the class
notice, and, in derogation of their duty as officers of the Court, they did not advise
against the course of action").
34.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §158 cmt.

I (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997) ("prior to certification, only those class members with
whom the lawyer maintains a personal client-lawyer relationship are clients"); MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.24, at 233 (3d ed. 1995) (noting that "no formal

attorney-client relationship exists between class counsel and the putative members of the
class prior to certification.").

508

THE REVIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 17:497

an uncertified class.35 Despite these rulings, the issue has not been
fully settled.
First, statements in what many regard as the leading treatise on
legal ethics can be fairly read to suggest that the issue is unresolved
and that the represented person rule applies to the pre-certification

context-at least in the case of certain forms of communication, such
as offers to settle on stated terms or attempts to elicit statements
concerning the matter in controversy that might be disadvantageous
to the makers of the statements. 6 In addition, the Reporter's Note to

35. See Babbitt v. Albertson's, Inc., 1993 WL 150300, at *1 (N.D. Cal., March
21, 1993) (finding that defense attorney's pre-certification communication with putative
class members did not violate anti-contact rule); Gibbons v. CIT Group/Sales Fin., Inc.,
400 S.E.2d 104, 107 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming order requiring attorneys on both
sides to notify each other in writing within twenty-four hours of name and address of
putative class member contacted, but otherwise permitting communication); Atari, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 867, 871 (Ct. Cal. App. 1985) ("We cannot accept
the suggestion that a potential (but as yet unapproached) class member should be deemed
'a party . . . represented by counsel' even before the class is certified."). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 158 cmt. I (Tentative Draft
No. 8, 1997) (commenting that "[pirior to certification and unless the court orders
otherwise, in the case of competing putative class actions a lawyer for one set of
representatives may contact class members who are only putatively represented by a
competing lawyer, but not class representatives or members known to be directly
represented in the matter by the other lawyer.").
36. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLiAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAwYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 4.2:
102, at 734-36 (2d ed. 1997 & 1998 Supp.):
Members of a class other than the designated class representatives have
an indeterminate status as participants in the litigation, at least until they
affirmatively "opt out" of the class, where that option is available under
governing rules of civil procedure. Forcertainpurposes... unnamed class
members should be regardedas clients of the lawyer representing the class
from the inception of the suit, even before its certificationby the court as a
proper class action. For example, most authorities rightly assume that the
lawyer acts in a fiduciary capacity toward these people, and thus owes them
duties of loyalty and care, even though he is still seeking formal authority to
proceed on their behalf ....
In light of this indeterminacy of the status of class members, it is not
obvious whether they should be regarded as "represented" persons for
purposes of Rule 4.2. Where there is already an ongoing relationship
between class members and the party opposing the class, such as between a
group of employees and their employer, direct independent communication
between the parties is inevitable, and additional communications through
counsel ought not to be prohibited as long as courtesy copies of
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the Restatement of the Law GoverningLawyers indicates that there is

support for a minority view that the anti-contact provision relating to
represented persons applies to pre-certification communications.

Finally, it is the personal knowledge of the author of this Article that
attorneys engaged in litigation still contest this issue and, with the
hope of securing favorable court rulings, obtain affidavits from
38
experts bearing upon the question.
Whatever uncertainty there is regarding the inapplicability of the
represented person rule to the pre-certification context of class
litigation can be dispelled through an exploration of the policies
underlying the rule.

II. The Policy Basis of the Represented Person Rule

Various rationales have been invoked to justify the sweeping
prohibitions of the rule against attorney communication with represented persons. In terms of their number and breadth and the
communications are provided to counsel. On the other hand, the lawyer for
the opponent of the class should not be allowed to take statements concerning
the matter in controversy from individual class members through cc parte
interviews, for that could impose the very disadvantages that the rule is
designed to prevent.
Intermediate situations should be resolved by reasoning from the
purpose of the Rule 4.2, which is primarily to protect opposing clients and
only incidentally to protect opposing lawyers.
(Footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
37. See REATmENT (THIRD) OF TnE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 158 cmt.
I (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997). Citing Impervious PaintIndustries,Inc., 508 F. Supp.
at 720, the Reporter's Note on comment 1states, "[P]re-certification contact-during optout period-violates anti-contact rule." The description of the Impervious Paintruling
may be incorrect, for it is not clear whether the contact by defense counsel with putative
class members occurred before or after certification. However, it is reasonable to
interpret the case as stating, at least in dicta, that putative class members are represented
even before certification for purposes of the anti-contact rule.
38. I gave such an affidavit on October 28, 1997, in City of Mercedes v. Reata
Indus. Gas, L.P., et al. (No. C-2262-97-A, 92nd District Court, Hidalgo County,
Texas), in which I opined that certain pre-certification contacts were not prohibited by
Rule 4.02 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. I understand that
the issue to which that affidavit related is no longer part of the case because a temporary
restraining order, prohibiting contact between defense counsel and putative class
members, has been lifted.
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certainty with which they are asserted, these reasons appear so
formidable that a foreign visitor initially encountering the rule might
easily conclude that it is no less than a fundamental precept of
American law, without which the entire legal system might collapse.3 9
While full precision in classifying these rationales is not possible, the

arguments generally fall into four categories which suggest that the
purposes of the rule are: (1) to protect a represented person from
overreaching by opposing counsel;4" (2) to promote the proper

functioning of the legal system; 41 (3) to protect the attorney-client

39. See In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 1998 WL 268540, at *6 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio, March 11, 1998) ("The anticontact rule is... imposed to protect... the very
integrity of the adversary system."); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 485 (D.N.M. 1992)
("[T]he ban on communicating with a represented party is a fundamental principle of
both state and federal law... and has its roots in our common law tradition.").
40. See, e.g., ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 392 (3d ed. 1996) (commenting that "[tihe
purpose of Rule 4.2 is to prevent lawyers from taking advantage of uncounselled
laypersons.") (citations omitted); 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 36, at 730 (noting
that "Rule 4.2 prevents a lawyer from taking advantage of a lay person to secure
admissions against interest or to achieve an unconscionable settlement of a dispute.");
id. at 731-32 (commenting that "[t]he purpose of the rule is ...to prevent clients from
being overreached by opposing lawyers."); Report of the ABA Standing Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, reprintedin GILmLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at
266 (noting the "need to protect uncounselled persons against being taken advantage of
by opposing counsel" and "need to protect uncounselled persons against the wiles of
opposing counsel"); Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 686 (stating: "Authorities ...usually
base the rule on the danger that lawyers will bamboozle parties unprotected by their own
counsel."); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (noting that the rule prevents lawyers from using superior skills and training to
obtain "unwise settlements").
41. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-18 (1980):
The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons in need of
legal advice or assistance are represented by their own counsel. For this
reason a lawyer should not communicate on the subject matter of the
representation of his client with a person he knows to be represented.
See also Polycast Tech. Corp., 129 F.R.D. at 625 (noting that the rule protects
privileged information and facilitates settlements by allowing lawyers skilled in
negotiating to conduct discussions); United States v. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. 812, 813
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (stating that there is a societal interest in laypersons not making
decisions with major legal implications without the advice of counsel); Leubsdorf, supra
note 2, at 686 (noting that "[a] less dramatic possibility [of harm] is that conversations
between a nonlawyer and an adverse lawyer will lead to disputes about what was said,
which may force the lawyer to become a witness.").
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relationship;42 and (4) to protect the interests of the attorney for the
represented person. 43
None of these arguments is sufficient to extend the anti-contact
rule to unnamed putative class members during the pre-certification
period.

A. Prevention of Overreaching
The prevention of overreaching of laypersons by attorneys

representing adverse parties is the justification most frequently urged
in defense of the no-contact rule.

This rationale has an aura of

altruistic consumer protection, and also a ring of truth. The represented person rule does indeed prevent overreaching of laypersons,
for it bans all forms of contact entirely, whether they involve

overreaching or not. Of course, whether such a drastic prohibition
is necessary to prevent overreaching is open to challenge. As
suggested above, 4' there are many more moderate alternative forms

of regulation that might prove to be adequate substitutes.
42. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supranote 40,
at 392 (stating that "[tihe purpose of Rule 4.2 is . . . to preserve the integrity of the
lawyer-client relationship."); Report of the ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, reprintedin GILERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 266 (noting
"importance of preserving the client-attorney relationship"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995) (stating that anti-contact rule
"safeguard[s] the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel"). See
also TEX. DIscIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4.02 cmt.1 (stating that the "Rule
is directed at efforts to circumvent the lawyer-client relationship existing between other
persons, organizations or entities of government and their respective counsel");
WOLFRAM, supranote 22, § 11.6.2, at 612 (noting that both DR 7-104(A)(1) and Rule
4.2 "strongly imply that their prohibitions are limited to attempts by the offending
lawyer, in representing his or her own client, to drive wedges between other lawyers and
clients.").
43. See, e.g., 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 36, at 731-32 (stating that "[t]he
purpose of the rule is to protect lawyers' agency relationships with their respective
clients"); id. at 736 (noting that "the purpose of the Rule ... [is] only incidentally to
protect opposing lawyers."). See also Lewis Kurlantzick, The Prohibition on
Communication with an Adverse Party, 51 CONN. B.J. 136, 138-52 (1977) (offering as
a possible justification for the rule the argument that it rescues lawyers from a painful
conflict between their duty to advance their client's interests and their duty not to
overreach an unprotected opposing party).
44. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
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In the class action context, a decision not to extend the represented person rule to the pre-certification period would not mean that
opposing counsel would be unregulated and free to overreach.

Communication with a person who does not have counsel must be
consistent with standards applicable to communications with unrepresented persons. As embodied in Model Rule 4.3,45 those standards

prohibit a lawyer from stating or implying "that the lawyer is
disinterested" 46 or from giving "advice to an unrepresented person

other than the advice to obtain counsel." 47 A lawyer's communications with an unrepresented person also must not run afoul of the
general rule that provides that a lawyer shall not "engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. "I

A lawyer

who makes a fraudulent statement to a non-client not only is subject
to discipline, but also may be sued for damages.49 In addition, a court

may enter an order limiting communications between a defendant and
potential class members based upon a specific showing of actual
threatened abuse.5 0 A court may also create procedures for monitor
45. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 (1997).
46. Id.
47. Id. cmt. 1 (1997).
48. Id. Rule 8.4(c).
49. See, e.g., Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468, 472
(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, n.w.h.) ("An attorney has no general duty to the
opposing party, but he is liable for injuries to third parties when his conduct is fraudulent
or malicious. He is not liable for breach of a duty to the third party, but he is liable for
fraud.") (citing Wilbourn v. Mostek Corp., 537 F. Supp. 302 (D. Colo. 1982)).
50. See Atari, Inc. v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 867, 871 (Ct. App.
1985). The Atari court denied such relief in a state action involving potential members
of an uncertified class, based on the guidance provided by the United States Supreme
Court in Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), a certified class action arising under
federal law:
In Gulf Oil a federal district court had imposed "a complete ban on all
communications concerning the class action between parties or their counsel
and any actual or potential class member who was not a formal party, without
the prior approval of the court" . . . and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine the scope of the court's authority to limit
communications from named plaintiffs to prospective class members. The
United States Supreme Court concluded that the federal district court had
exceeded the scope of its authority, quoting from Coles v. Marsh (3d Cir.
1977) 560 F.2d 186, 189: "[To the extent that the district court is
empowered .. .to restrict certain communications in order to prevent
frustration of the policies of Rule 23, it may not exercise the power without
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ing whether abuse occurs, such as a requirement that copies of all
written communications be filed with the court and provided to
opposing counsel. 1 The availability of this diverse array of safe-

guards for preventing overreaching of unnamed putative class
members, by itself, is good reason for not extending the absolute and

inflexible terms of the represented person rule to the pre-certification
period of class action litigation.
From a different perspective, in terms of the need for protection
from overreaching, there is no basis for distinguishing putative
members of an uncertified class from other unrepresented persons
who might bring suit. In the tort context, if a person is injured in an

accident, that person, before engaging counsel, may be contacted by
an attorney for the defendant with an offer to settle potential claims. 2

This is true, even though there may be a risk of overreaching because
the amount of the offer is inadequate, there is pressure to make a
quick decision, or for some other reason.53 Although certain
members of the bar have decried such settlement practices,'M they tend
a specific record showing by the moving party of the particular abuses by
which it is threatened. Moreover, the district court must find that the
showing provides a satisfactory basis for relief and that the relief sought
would be consistent with the policies of Rule 23 giving explicit consideration
to the narrowest possible relief which would protect the respective parties."
166 Cal. App. 3d at 871 (citing Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 102); see also Hampton Hardware,
Inc. v. Cotter & Co., Inc., 156 F.R.D. 630, 635 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that a
lawyer who had on three occasions contacted potential class members, warning them not
to join a class action, was prohibited from further contact with potential class members
regarding the action until the date of trial or the date of an order denying certification).
51. See In Re Potash Antitrust Litigation, 896 F. Supp. 916, 919 n.5 (D. Minn.
1995) (declining to "assess the compliance" of counsel with Model Rule 4.2 and noting
that if a breach of the rule occurred it was de minimis).
52. See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 36, at 747 (stating that "lawyers for
insurance companies have been permitted to negotiate settlements with unrepresented tort
victims and workers' compensation claimants").
53. Cf. id. at 748-749 (discussing the "potential for overreaching" that is present
when a lawyer seeks to obtain a release from an unrepresented person and criticizing
Model Rule 4.3 for not adequately dealing with that subject).
54. See Richard Connelly, Billboard War Heats Up Amid Big Suits, Barratry
Allegations, TEX. LAW., Aug. 18, 1997, at 19 (quoting David Bright, a Texas attorney,
as stating, with regard to the legal issues arising from refinery explosions, "I don't see
[barratry in Corpus Christi] as being as big a problem as the refineries signing releases
....
I'm sure there are people out there ambulance chasin [sic]-but signing releases
is a greater evil.").

THE REVIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 17:497

to be lone voices. Thus, while personal contact with unrepresented

persons in the form of client solicitation continues to be vigorously
condemned,55 there is no significant movement in the legal profession
to ban contacts between defense attorneys, or persons acting on their
behalf, and unrepresented accident victims. The lack of any such call
for reform may simply reflect the power of the defense bar and the

clients it represents. Or it may reflect a general consensus that the
usual rules (which, as mentioned above, prohibit giving advice to an
unrepresented person and making false statements) are adequate for
dealing with the risk of overreaching that accompanies such contacts.
If the latter is true, those same safeguards should also adequately
protect unnamed putative members of an uncertified class action
arising from an accident.
A variation of the view that the anti-contact rule prevents
overreaching is the argument that the rule saves a represented person
from being deprived of the protection that he or she attempted to
secure by electing to engage counsel, 6 whether by reducing the
likelihood of inadvertent harmful disclosures or otherwise.57 The idea

55. See Susan Borreson, State BarLashes Out at O'Quinn, TEX. LAW., Jan. 5,
1998, at 1, 18-19 (reporting barratry prosecution based on case-running allegations).
56. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 64-65 (arguing that the rule is "designed to
prevent an opposing lawyer from gaining an adversarialadvantage for [his or her] client
by circumventing, through direct dealings with a layperson, the protections which that
individual has sought to obtain by choosing to retain counsel"). See also In re Complaint
of Korea Shipping Corp., 621 F. Supp. 164, 167 (D. Alaska 1985):
The thrust of DR 7-104 "is to prevent situations in which a represented party
may be taken advantage of by adverse counsel."... A related purpose of the
rule is to "preserve the proper functioning of the legal profession" by
ensuring that in making decisions relating to a dispute a client has the benefit
of the advice of the legal expert he has employed to assist him.
(citations omitted); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
95-396 (1995) (commenting that "[t]here is nothing more central to what it means to be
a client in the American system of justice than to know that, having hired a lawyer, the
client need not worry about being taken advantage of by lawyers, with special skills and
training, who represent others.").
57. See In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 1998 WL 105451, at *5 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio, March 11, 1998) (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995), which stated that "'the Rule operates to
reduce the likelihood of the represented person engaging in communications that might
ultimately prove harmful to her cause by imposing a strict ethical obligation on the
communicating lawyer."').

1998]

COMMUNICATING WITH A CLASS MEMBER

515

here is that a person should not be stripped of the fruits of his or her
own diligent efforts, namely the advantages that are secured by
obtaining counsel. Put differently: to encourage diligence, diligence
should be rewarded.58 Whatever force these arguments may have in
the usual case, they have no application to unnamed putative class
members. Such persons have not sought to engage an attorney.
Permitting opposing counsel to communicate directly would therefore
not take away any benefits that the unnamed putative class members
had previously sought to obtain. The diligence rationale does not
apply because there is no "diligence" to be rewarded.

B. Promotionof the ProperFunctioning of the Legal System
It is sometimes asserted that the represented person rule promotes
the proper functioning of the legal system.59 Taken at a broad level
of generality, the correctness of this statement is not obvious. To
begin with, the rule exacts a high toll in transaction costs: "Requiring
both lawyers to be present whenever one is present imposes inconvenience and expense. "I In addition, there are many facets to the legal
system aside from adversarial litigation, and it may not be useful to
structure the ethics rules applicable to non-litigation fields, such as

58. This rationale is similar to one that runs throughout tort law, namely that "tort
law should encourage individuals to employ available resources to protect their own
interests." VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW

6 (1994).
59. See Carter v. Kamaras, 430 A.2d 1058, 1059 (R.I. 1981) (arguing that the
rule preserves the proper functioning of the legal system); In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc.,
1998 WL 105451, at *6 ("The anti-contact rule is more than common courtesy; it is a
professional requirement imposed to protect the client, other parties, and indeed, the very
integrity of the adversary system."); see also supra note 41.
60. Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 687; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAw GovENING LAWYERS § 158 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997) (noting that the
rule has been criticized for requiring three-stage communications that are often more
expensive, delayed, and inconvenient than direct communication).
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transactional law practice, on an adversarial model.61 Moreover, the
idea that one lawyer must be present to neutralize the presence of
another lawyer is not necessarily sound. Sophisticated business
clients, for example, may be better able than their lawyers to conduct
negotiations, and are perfectly capable of deciding whether they
should communicate with opposing counsel directly. It is not clear
that, outside of litigation, the inflexible formalities of the represented
person rule optimize the proper functioning of the legal process.
With respect to the litigation arena, it has been argued that the
anti-contact rule protects privileged information and facilitates
settlements. 62 The first of these justifications has no application to
unnamed putative class members, who, since they are unrepresented,
have not engaged in communications with counsel that might be
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Doubts can also be raised
about the merits of the settlement-facilitation rationale. It is easy to
think of situations where the involvement of an attorney has been an
obstacle, rather than an aid, to the settlement of a dispute.63 Admittedly, many lawyers can marshal the facts and the law in a way that
compellingly presents a client's case, and such efforts tend to make
settlement more likely. However, this line of reasoning is more
justification for why laypersons should have lawyers than for why
there should be a rule banning an opposing attorney from communicating with a represented person. To that extent, it is difficult to
differentiate the unnamed putative class member in a mass tort case
from the unrepresented victim of a non-mass tort. Both victims,
under this view, would be better off with attorneys. There is no good

61.

Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 689:

In many instances-for example, when two small business firms are working
out the details of a joint venture-there is not the slightest reason why every
inquiry coming to or from one lawyer must travel by way of another. In such
situations, it might be perfectly sensible for one party to do without a lawyer
altogether ....Some clients may even be better suited than some lawyers
to conduct some meetings.
62. See, e.g., Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
63. Cf. WOLFRAM, supra note 22, § 11.6, at 613-14 ("A strict anticontact rule
pinches with particular pain when an unreasonable, and possibly disloyal, opposing
lawyer refuses to transmit settlement offers to his or her client. But the ABA ethics
committee has refused to recognize an exception here.") (citations omitted).
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reason for saying that the mass tort victim who is a putative class

member should be protected by the anti-contact rule while the victim
of the non-mass tort will not.
An interesting variation on systemic justifications for the anticontact rule is a recent Texas case which appears to take the position
that a purpose of the rule, as applied to jointly represented defendants, is to prevent one codefendant from being induced to switch
sides to the disadvantage of the others.' An abhorrence for unprincipled side-switching has been a driving force behind many rulings in
the tort field,' such as prohibitions against Mary Carter agreements 6
64. See In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 1998 WL 105451, at *6 (granting
disqualification based on contact by plaintiffs' counsel with individual defendant who was
later non-suited from action). The opinion of the court stated in part:
Clearly Frazier has changed sides in this case and, as a result, may avoid
personal exposure in the suit. That will undoubtedly cause prejudice to the
remaining defendants who shared the same attorney ....
Although the
improper communication of privileged information is difficult to prove
without direct testimony from the client, it can reasonably be implied by
virtue of the fact that plaintiffs have designated him as a testifying expert on
their behalf ....
The anti-contact rule is ... imposed to protect the client, otherparties, and
indeed, the very integrity of the adversary system.
(emphasis added.)
65. See Timothy D. Howell, So Long "Sweetheart"-StateFarm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Gandy Swings the Pendulum Further to the Right as the Latest in a Line of
Setbacks for Texas Plaintiffs, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 47, 66-70 (1997) (discussing Texas
cases in which shifting positions of parties distorted litigation).
66. The Texas Supreme Court defined a Mary Carter agreement as follows:
A Mary Carter agreement exists . . . when the plaintiff enters into a
settlement agreement with one defendant and goes to trial against the
remaining defendant(s). The settling defendant, who remains a party,
guarantees the plaintiff a minimum payment, which may be offset in whole
or in part by an excess judgment recovered at trial . . . . This creates a
tremendous incentive for the settling defendant to ensure that the plaintiff
succeeds in obtaining a sizeable recovery, and thus motivates the defendant
to assist greatly in the plaintiffs presentation of the case.
Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Tex. 1992). Because of the tendency of such
arrangements to distort the adversarial process, many courts allow evidence of a Mary
Carter agreement to be introduced at trial, for the purpose of minimizing the chances that
the jury will be misled. See id. at 24849 (discussing cases and commentary that have
"remove[d] the secrecy within which Mary Carter agreements have traditionally been
shrouded."). Some courts have imposed greater limitations. See id. at 250 (declaring
Mary Carter agreements void as against public policy, based in part on the tendency of
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or the assignment of certain claims. 67 However, whether the risk that
communications by opposing counsel may lead a represented person
to "switch sides" is sufficiently great as to justify a total prophylactic
ban on such communications is debatable. Other alternative safeguards are available, such as a bar against the use of testimony by the
person who switched sides 68 or disqualification of counsel in cases
where a communication with a represented person is followed by a
change of sides. 69 In any event, the side-switching rationale has no
application to the pre-certification context of class action litigation.
During that time period, unnamed putative class members are not on
anyone's side. They have neither opted into nor out of the class. An
extension of the anti-contact rule to pre-certification communications
cannot be justified by the risk-of-side-switching rationale.
C. Protectionof the Lawyer-Client Relationship
A number of authorities take the position that the represented
person rule is designed to preserve the integrity of the lawyer-client
relationship.70 Just what is meant by this argument is not clear.
Perhaps the best elaboration of this view is the suggestion by one
scholar that the prohibitions of the rule are "limited to attempts by the
offending lawyer, in representing his or her client, to drive wedges
between other lawyers and clients. 71 So construed, the rule serves
the laudable goal of preserving whatever exists by way of a healthy,
productive relationship between attorney and client. However, if
understood in those terms, the rule has no application to unnamed
putative class members. Those persons are not engaged in any
such agreements to cause unprincipled side-switching).
67. See Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1994, writ ref d) (holding assignment of cause of action for legal
malpractice invalid).
68. Cf. Elbaor, 845 S.W.2d at 252 (declaring Mary Carter agreements void as
against public policy and ruling that a settling defendant may not participate in a trial in
which he or she retains a financial interest in the plaintiff's lawsuit).
69. See In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 1998 WL 105451, at *5-*6 (granting
disqualification based on contact by plaintiffs' counsel with individual defendant who
switched sides).
70. See supra note 42.
71. WOLFRAM, supra note 22, § 11.6.2, at 612.
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professional relationship with the attorney for the class, productive or

not. Consequently, there is no relationship to be preserved from the
divisive "wedges" of opposing counsel. This line of reasoning cannot

justify an extension of the anti-contact provision to the pre-certification period.
Another possibility is that those who argue that the rule preserves
the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship mean that it preserves
the power and authority of the lawyer vis-a-vis the client. This
construction is suggested by those terms of the rule that place the
right to consent to communication solely within the hands of the

lawyer and entirely beyond the reach of the client.

Any such

argument in favor of allocating all authority to the professional party

to the relationship is markedly out of step with the times. A growing
body of court decisions and other authority recognizes, in myriad
contexts, the right of a client to be informed of all material matters"

and to exercise control over important decisions.73 Viewed against
the trend toward client empowerment, the represented person rule
stands out as a stark aberration. It is a better candidate for abrogation

than for unnecessary extension to the pre-certification context of class
action litigation.

72. See, e.g., Garris v. Severson, 252 Cal. Rptr. 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1988)
(depublished opinion) (denying summary judgment motion filed by firm and attorney in
case where both were being sued for failure to disclose fully and fairly to client facts on
liability); Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi
1991, writ denied) (commenting that "the relationship between attorney and client has
been described as one of uberrimafides, which means, 'most abundant good faith,'
requiring absolute and perfect candor, openness and honesty, and the absence of any
concealment or deception.") (citations omitted). See generally Robert F. Cochran, Legal
Representationand the Next Steps Toward Client Control:Attorney Malpracticefor the
Failureto Allow the Client to ControlNegotiation and PursueAlternatives to Litigation,
47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990) (discussing the extent of client control over legal
representation).
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1997) ("A
lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to
be pursued."); id. at Rule 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation."); id. at Rule 1.14(a) ("When a client's ability to make adequately
considered decisions in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because
of minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.").

520

THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION

[Vol. 17:497

A more palatable rationale is the argument that the anti-contact
rule is designed "to ensure that the adverse party's attorney can
function properly." 74 This may mean nothing more than that the rule
places the attorney in a position to learn relevant facts and to control
the flow of information about a client's case. Interpreted in that vein,
the rule may go further than is necessary to advance those goals, but
is otherwise unobjectionable. However, this rationale offers no
justification for extending the anti-contact rule to communications
involving unnamed putative class members before certification. The
attorney for the class has no right to control the flow of information
from such persons and no duty to gather facts about their claims.
Cessante rationaelegis, cessat et ipsa lex.
D. Protection of the Attorney's Interests
One occasionally encounters arguments which tend to suggest that
a purpose of the anti-contact rule is to protect interests of the
attorney, rather than the interests of the client, the system, or the
relationship. The personal interests of the attorney might be
reputational, such as where an attorney fears that he or she may be
embarrassed because uncounselled statements made by a client may
compromise the lawyer's tactics.76 Or the interests might be
economic, where an uncounselled client, as the result of communications with opposing counsel, may discharge the attorney or settle for
an inadequate amount, either of which may impair the attorney's
ability to earn a fee.
Any defense of the anti-contact rule based on the personal
interests of the attorney is typically made with timidity. The
proponents of such views are apologetic or otherwise tend to suggest

74. In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 485 (D.N.M. 1992) (quoting United States v.
Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1447-49 (N.D. Cal. 1991)).
75. "The reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 238 (6th ed. 1990).
76. 2 HAZARD & HODES,

supra note 36, at 731 (citing John Leubsdorf,
Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client: The Lawyer's Veto and the Client's
Interest, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 683 (1979)).
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that such interests are entitled to only secondary protection.77
However, it is indisputable that lawyers do have legally protectable

interests in their relationships with clients.
With limited exceptions not pertinent here, a client has a right to
discharge an attorney. 78 But if the discharge is made without cause,
virtually all states hold that the client is liable to the discharged

lawyer for unpaid hourly fees or for the quantum meruit value of
services performed under a contingent-fee contract.79 Indeed, Texas

goes so far as to treat a discharge without cause as a breach of a
contingent-fee contract by the client that entitles the lawyer to the full
value of the contract, calculated as though services had been com-

pletely performed.8" These rules on liability for fees are one
indication that personal interests of an attorney in an attorney-client
relationship are legally cognizable.
More important for present purposes, the law of tortious
interference protects contractual relationships, even those such as

attorney-client contracts, that are terminable at will.8 The law of
tortious interference safeguards interests in a relationship from
unprivileged purposeful or knowing disruption by a person outside the

relationship. According to the formulation found in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, under the law of tortious interference:
[o]ne who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract. . . between another and a third person, by preventing the other
from performing the contract or causing his performance to be more
expensive and burdensome, is subject to liability to the other for the
pecuniary loss resulting to him. 2

77. Id. at 736 (commenting that "the purpose of the Rule 4.2... is primarily to
protect opposing clients and only incidentally to protect opposing lawyers.").
78. See, e.g., TEx. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.15 cmt. 4
(explaining that in Texas, a client has the right "to discharge an attorney at any time,
with or without cause").
79. See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Client Liabilityfor Fees of Discharged
Counsel, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 99 (explaining that a discharged attorney may recover the
quantum meruit value of services performed).
80. See Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969)
(explaining that in Texas "an attorney may recover on the contract for the amount of his
compensation" when discharged without good cause).
81. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 766 cmt. g (1977) (explaining that until
such contract is terminated, it is valid and subsisting).
82. Id. § 766A (1977).
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In one sense, the represented person rule can be understood as an

extension of the principles of tortious interference. That is, the rule's
anti-contact ban imposes what in essence is a form of mandatory
injunction against the type of interference with a relationship that
might support an action for damages. So viewed, the ethical
prohibition is seriously flawed, for it obviates any inquiry into the
critical issues that determine under tort law whether interference is,

rather than simply may be, actionable.
Interference resulting from the dissemination of truthful informa-

tion is generally privileged." The same is true of interference that is
caused by conduct that is undertaken in furtherance of a duty to
protect the interests of another, if that conduct does not involve

"wrongful means" (such as threats, falsity, or violence).'M These
principles mean that under tort law, in many instances, a lawyer
would have no cause of action for relational disruption resulting from

opposing counsel's communication with his or her client. In addition,
some courts decline to follow the Restatement formulation of tortious
interference and hold that mere "burdening" of the performance of a

contract is not actionable, even if destruction of a relationship will
support a suit for damages.85 Since many communications by

83. See id. § 772(a) (1977) (stating that it is not tortious interference of contract
to give truthful information to a third person); World Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 26 F.3d
1089, 1092 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that § 772 reflects the law of Florida); Liebe v. City
Fin. Co., 295 N.W.2d 16, 18 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that transmission of truthful
information is privileged); Delloma v. Consol. Coal Co., 996 F.2d 168, 171 (7th Cir.
1993) (explaining that Illinois law provides a privilege "if the defendant acted in good
faith to protect an interest or uphold a duty"). But see Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d
786, 790 (Utah 1994) (rejecting Restatement section that provides a privilege for truthful
information).
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 770 (1977); see also Tarleton State
Univ. v. Rosiere, 867 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, writ dism.'d by
agr.) (explaining that vice-president for student services did not improperly interfere with
tenure applicant's relationship with university by informing president of university about
applicant's behavior at a school function).
85. See Price v. Sorrell, 784 P.2d 614, 615 (Wyo. 1989) (declining to adopt
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766A); see also Windsor Sec., Inc. v. Hartford Life Ins.
Co., 986 F.2d 655, 662-63 (3d Cir. 1993) (casting doubt on Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 766A and declining to decide whether Pennsylvania would adopt it). But see
Larouche v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134, 1140 (4th Cir. 1986) (awarding
damages for burdens entailed by false statement that interview, which later took place,
had been cancelled).
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opposing counsel with a represented person will not result in
termination of the representation, but merely "burden" the representation in the sense of making it more difficult or time consuming, or
less productive, such interference might not be actionable in tort. For
these reasons, it is difficult, if not impossible, to defend the represented person rule as a legitimate device for protecting the personal
interests of an attorney in a lawyer-client relationship. It makes no
sense to "enjoin" conduct that would be legally insufficient to support
an action for damages.
Furthermore, the principles of tortious interference are applicable
only if a plaintiff has a legitimate expectation in the future relations
that are the basis of the claim. What this means is that there must be
an existing valid contract or a "reasonable probability" that one will
be consummated.86 The loss of a relationship that is merely hoped for
will not support a cause of action.87 If it is a matter of speculation
whether a relationship will come to fruition, there is no cause of
action for tortious interference with prospective advantage.
Counsel for an uncertified class has no more than a hope that a
relationship will be consummated with unnamed putative class
members, for it is entirely speculative whether the court (after
considering the requirements of numerosity, typicality, commonality,
and representativeness) will certify the class 88 and whether those
putative members (after being apprised of the action and available
opportunities) will elect to opt out of the class. For that reason alone,
the attorney-interest-protection rationale fails to justify an extension
of the anti-contact rationale to the pre-certification context of class
action litigation.

86. See Nathanson v. Medical College of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1392 (3d Cir.
1991) (explaining that a medical school applicant failed to demonstrate "reasonable
probability" of acceptance).
87. See id. (stating that although the applicant "had a 'satisfactory academic
record and background,' she had 'not demonstrated more than a mere hope in securing
a prospective relationship with a medical school"') (citations omitted).
88. All four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) must be met before certification of a class
is appropriate. See Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 810 (5th Cir. 1982).
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IV. Conclusion
The ethical prohibition against contact with represented persons
is an exacting rule that carries with it the threat of serious consequences, including, but not limited to, attorney discipline, disqualification of counsel, and inadmissibility of evidence obtained in
violation of its terms. The rule is so deeply entrenched in American
law practice that any attempts to change its fundamental contours are
probably ill-fated. Nonetheless, extension of the rule to new settings
should be undertaken with the greatest care, particularly because its
anti-contact provisions often prove to be unnecessarily harsh and there
are other regulatory alternatives available. The various rationales
offered in support of the rule fail to justify an application of the
contact ban to communications with unnamed putative class members
during the pre-certification period of class action litigation. Consequently, before certification, unnamed putative class members should
not be treated as "represented persons" for purposes of the rule.

